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This paper investigates how platform design features affect the funding motivation of Muslim users on a 
loan-based crowdfunding platform. Theoretically grounded in Andreoni’s warm-glow giving theory and Sober 
and Wilson’s model of evolutionary and psychological giving, this work has high practical relevance in light of 
the increasing demand for Islamic financial products. Loan-based crowdfunding platforms are important to the 
unique context of this research since Islamic religious constraints regulate monetary transactions concerning 
lending. We used a scenario-based survey developed on the basis of a pilot study and confirmed by our 
manipulation check. The results showed that ‘hedonism’ represented by monetary interest negatively affected 
Muslim users’ willingness to engage in a loan-based crowdfunding platform. This finding challenges the 
commonly agreed-upon egoistic motivator for loan-based crowdfunding platforms (i.e., monetary interest) that 
is designed based on Western Christian and Chinese Confucian capitalist economic and financial 
paradigms. Remarkably, we also found that the Muslim funders' willingness to engage on the hedonistic 
platform had an exponentially positive effect on the amount of money that the funders are willing to lend. By 
contrast, ‘warm-glow giving’ manifested as belongingness to a community had no effect on users' engagement. 
Implications of these findings for theory and practice are discussed. 
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Crowdfunding, the idea of raising relatively small contributions of funding for a project or a venture from a 
large number of investors (e.g., Fleming and Sorenson 2016; Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010), is not new. 
The emergence of online crowdfunding platforms facilitates the reach of millions of potential investors (Burtch 
et al. 2013). Recent technological developments, such as video-hosting and web-based payments, unlock new 
opportunities for project owners to pitch ideas, persuade investors, engage in social networks, and collect funds 
(Gerber and Hui 2013; Ordanini et al. 2011).  
In extant research on crowdfunding, most studies examine the funders or the project owners, such as how the 
funders decide which projects to fund and how the project owners present themselves and their projects to 
attract funding (e.g., Gerber and Hui 2013; Gleasure and Feller 2016a; Mollick 2014). Interestingly, while loan-
based crowdfunding has by far the largest funding volume and is growing (Fleming and Sorenson 2016), 
research on loan-based crowdfunding is scarce and the loan lender’s motivation is still underexplored (e.g., 
Jiang et al. 2018). Perhaps because the lenders receive interest on the amount lent, their motivation is assumed 
to be straightforward – but as our study shows, it is not. Further, the few studies on crowdfunding that examine 
the design of crowdfunding mostly focus on the design of the economic incentives for the funders such as the 
posted price vs auction and the pre-ordering vs profit sharing (e.g., Belleflamme et al. 2014, 2015; Tomczak and 
Brem 2013).    
The culture and values that determine monetary transactions and lending behavior are often overlooked 
(Burtch et al. 2014). The design of incentives for loan-based crowdfunding platforms is predominantly rooted in 
the Western Christian and Chinese Confucian capitalist economy and financial paradigms. It stands in sharp 
contrast with Muslims, an overlooked population in crowdfunding research, and their Islamic religious 
constraints. During the 2008 financial crisis, the Islamic financial system with its different incentive structure 
was largely resilient to the crisis (Al-Zumai and Al-Wasmi 2016). Since then, more investors are paying 
significant attention to Islamic-based investment opportunities. Ironically, researchers are examining 
crowdfunding in capitalism-based economies and much remains unknown about effective crowdfunding in the 
Islamic economic context. Therefore, there is an important need for an investigation into the Islamic financial 
system (e.g., Aldohni 2014) and the influence of religion on customer behavior (e.g., Assadi 2003). In this 
study, we investigate how platform design features affect the funding motivation of Muslim users on a loan-
based crowdfunding platform. 
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Islam regulates monetary transactions concerning lending and investing. Existing loan-based crowdfunding 
platforms use interest-based systems or interests charged on the amount lent. Interest-based systems are 
forbidden by the Islamic principle known as Sharia law. These constraints concerning monetary transactions 
rooted in the Muslim religion are likely to influence Muslim lenders’ engagement in loan-based crowdfunding 
platforms. In brief, the Quran encourages Muslims’ benevolent spending and disapproves of the concept of 
taking interest from the money lent. Accordingly, the Muslim perspective for lending money is not in alignment 
with the incentives designed for loan-based crowdfunding platforms.  
The trend to implement a Sharia-friendly system has certainly grown in financial services. With nearly two 
billion Muslims, Islam is the second-largest and fastest-growing religion in the world (Hackett et al. 2015). By 
2050, Muslims and Christians are expected to make up an equal share of approximately 30% each of the world 
population (Hackett et al. 2015). Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Islamic banking sector is growing 
(Aldohni 2014), and attention to this largely understudied lender group has increased. For example, a new 
interest-free loan offered by the Norwegian bank Storebrand is appealing to Muslims who cannot take up 
ordinary loans because of their faith (Mortimer 2017). Loan-based crowdfunding platforms can increase their 
reach significantly by taking the religious constraints of the Muslim community into account and by integrating 
them into the platform design.  
This research builds on Andreoni’s theory of warm-glow giving (1990) and Sober and Wilson’s model of 
evolutionary and psychological egoism (1998) to understand how loan-based crowdfunding platform design 
influences Muslim users’ engagement. These theories explain how egoism in the form of warm-glow giving and 
hedonism drives human giving behavior. In our study, we translate these egoistic drivers into sense of 
community and loan interest respectively. While “sense of community” is a basic human need that is in line 
with Islamic laws that encourage building relationships with others, we expect the latter to be contested by the 
Muslim community. We use a scenario-based survey where every participant receives one randomly selected 
design out of three designs of a loan-based crowdfunding platform (i.e., warm-glow giving, hedonism, or the 
base altruism design). Investigating how the crowdfunding platform design impacts the Muslim funders’ 
motivation is important for several reasons. From a theoretical view, the Muslim financial constraints may 
challenge the commonly agreed-upon motivators such as receiving monetary interest. From a practical 
perspective, our study is relevant because micro-loans can potentially stimulate economic growth in developing 
countries (Khavul 2010) where Muslim communities make up a remarkable percentage of the population. This 
highlights the need for loan-based crowdfunding that is suitable for Muslim users.   
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This paper is structured as follows. We first review the extant literature on crowdfunding. Then, we 
introduce our core theoretical foundation, which is Andreoni’s warm-glow giving theory and enrich it with a 
model proposed by Sober and Wilson (1998), which enables us to differentiate further the aspects of egoism. 
We elaborate on the Islamic rules regarding lending money and how these may affect Muslims’ behavior. 
Further, we develop our research hypotheses by building on the theories and those parts of Sharia law relevant 
to money lending. In the methodology section, we explain our research design, including a pilot study to derive 
the appropriate design variations for the main study, and then we present the manipulation check, data analysis, 
and results. Finally, we conclude with a discussion highlighting our theoretical and practical contributions. 
Conceptual Background  
Crowdfunding involves “an open call, mostly through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources 
either in the form of donation or in exchange for the future product or some form of reward to support initiatives 
for specific purposes” (Belleflamme et al. 2014, p. 588). As the term suggests, crowdfunding enables people 
from different backgrounds with similar interests to fund or financially support certain projects, efforts, or 
initiatives from others in a collective manner (Ordanini et al. 2011). Generally, there are two types of 
participants in crowdfunding: creators and funders. The creators are entrepreneurs or innovators who propose 
ideas, projects, or campaigns that require a considerable amount of funding. They pitch, persuade, and sell their 
ideas to other people (i.e., the crowd) on the crowdfunding platform through stories, videos, pictures, offers, or 
social interaction. Depending on the types of the crowdfunding platform, they are also known as founders, 
borrowers, fundraisers, or ventures (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010; Gerber and Hui 2013; Burtch et al. 
2013; Mollick 2014; Belleflamme et al. 2014). On the other side, the funders financially support certain ideas, 
projects, or campaigns that meet their interest through the platform. They represent the crowd that collectively 
funds the project without having a formal financial intermediary. They are also known as backers, supporters, 
investors, lenders, sponsors, crowdfunders, or contributors (Ordanini et al. 2011; Gerber and Hui 2013; Burtch 
et al. 2013; Moritz et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016; Burtch et al. 2016).  
Crowdfunding platforms vary depending on what they offer to funders. Commonly, four different types of 
platforms are distinguished in the literature (e.g., Fleming and Sorenson 2016; Kromidha and Robson 2016), 
namely reward-, equity-, donation- and loan-based crowdfunding. Reward-based crowdfunding is widely known 
as pre-purchasing since it usually invites the crowd to purchase products or goods in advance of their production 
or at the start of the project. They usually offer certain tangible or intangible rewards or pre-purchasing benefits 
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based on the amount of funding, for example Kickstarter.com and Indiegogo.com. Equity-based crowdfunding 
is also known as investment-based crowdfunding since it allows entrepreneurs to offer “a specified amount of 
equity or bond-like shares in a company on the Internet, hoping to attract a large group of investors” (Ahlers et 
al. 2015, p.1). Platforms like Crowdcube.com, Crowdfunder.com, and Shadowfoundr.com specifically aim to 
address the needs of entrepreneurs, small ventures, start-ups, and small-to-medium business owners. On the 
donation-based or charity crowdfunding platforms, the fundraisers do not offer monetary incentives, but rather 
information and feedback such as medication fees, cultural projects, animal care, education, and social projects 
on e.g., Chuffed.org and Razoo.com. Loan-based crowdfunding or group-lending crowdfunding platforms such 
as Prosper.com, Kiva.org, and Zopa.com enable the funders to lend money to project creators. As the name 
suggests, these platforms allow project creators to ask for loans with or without financial interest.  
What We Know So Far About Crowdfunding  
A growing body of work exists related to crowdfunding research published in the last decade. To investigate 
what we know so far about crowdfunding and to point out the relevant research gap, we conducted a literature 
review. This section positions our study against prior research. We identified the relevant research about 
crowdfunding by conducting an initial search in the leading journals in management science, information 
systems, and business venturing dating back to 2010 and searching the references cited in the identified papers 
for relevant peer-reviewed journal papers. We discovered four themes based on the main research objectives: 1) 
the emergence of crowdfunding, 2) success factors of crowdfunding projects, 3) motivation to contribute to a 
crowdfunding project, and 4) crowdfunding design. Papers that do not belong to any of these themes are 
classified as “others.” We structured the extant literature on crowdfunding around these themes and discovered 
that reward-based crowdfunding is the most researched, whereas loan-based crowdfunding is the least popular 





Table 1. Classification of Reviewed Literature by Crowdfunding Type and Theme 
Research 
Theme Reward-Based Equity-Based 
Donation-
Based Loan-Based General Total 





Ordanini et al. (2011) Agrawal et al. 
(2014) 
    Lehner 
(2013) 
10 
Stevenson et al. (2019b) Ley and 
Waven (2011)  
Lehner et al. 
(2015) 



















Burtch et al. 
(2013) 
Belleflamme 
et al. (2013) 
27 
Burtch et al. (2016) Kleinert and 
Volkmann 
(2019) 
Li et al. 
2020 
Burtch et al. 
(2014) 
  
Colombo et al. (2015) 
 
Kgoroeadira 
et al. (2019) Cornelius and Gokpinar 
(2020) 
Mortiz et al. 
(2015) 




(2015) Geva et al. (2019)  
Gleasure et al. (2019) 
 
Guan et al. (2020) 
Hong, Hu, and Burtch (2018) 
Kim and Hann (2020) 
Kromidha and Robson (2016) 
Lee and Sohn (2019) 
Liang et al. (2019) 
Mollick (2014) 
Younkin and Kuppuswamy 
(2018) 






Burtch et al. (2015) Bapna (2019) Choy and 
Schlagwein 
(2016) 




Burtch et al. (2018) 
Du et al. (2019a) Cholakova and 
Clarysse 
(2015)  
Jiang et al. 
(2018) Du et al. (2019b) 




et al. (2017) Li and Wang (2019) Mahmood et al. (2019) Ryu et al. (2020) 
Thies et al. (2016) Nitani et al. 
(2019) 
 






    Wei and Lin 
(2017) 
Bellflamme 
et al. (2014) 
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Siering et al. (2018) Stemler (2013) 
Thies et al. (2016) Stevenson et 
al. (2019a) Tuo et al. (2019) Tomczak 
and Brem 
(2013) 
Xu et al. (2015)  
  




1) The emergence of crowdfunding. Early publications focused on the emergence of crowdfunding as an 
alternative to traditional venture funding with some authors (Lehner 2013; Ley and Weaven 2011) proposing a 
research agenda for crowdfunding research. As an emerging phenomenon, the general investigations of the 
potential and implications for stakeholders such as entrepreneurs (Voelker and McGlashan 2013) and service 
managers (Rossi 2014) seem useful first steps. Ordanini et al. (2011) explained that crowdfunding changes the 
understanding of the customer from a target to an active investor and challenges the intermediary role of 
marketers and financial institutions. Lehner at el. (2015) argued that the increasing demand for an alternative 
source of funding for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is an important reason behind the success of 
crowdfunding. Stevenson et al. (2019b) demonstrated a shift from established entrepreneurial hot spots to a 
more diverse range of regions, while Mamonov and Malaga (2019) emphasized the supplementing role of equity 
crowdfunding to traditional venture funding. Agrawal et al. (2014) explored the impact of equity-based 
crowdfunding, while Schwienbacher (2019) assessed the challenges of equity-based crowdfunding.  
2) Success factors of crowdfunding projects. This theme has received by far the most attention from the 
scientific community (see Table 1). Researchers found that non-profit projects are more likely to get the desired 
funding (Belleflamme et al. 2013). Moreover, the funders and the project creators’ geographical proximity and 
cultural similarity (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2015; Burtch et al. 2014; Lin and Viswanathan 2015), the project 
creators’ social networks (e.g., Ahlers et al. 2015; Colombo et al. 2015; Hong et al. 2018; Li et al. 2020; Mollick 
2014; Zheng et al. 2014), the project creators’ personal characteristics (Burtch and Chan 2019; Kgoroeadira et 
al. 2018; Kim and Hann 2019), and the signals of project quality and founders’ trustworthiness (e.g., Geva et al. 
2019; Gleasure et al. 2019; Kromidha and Robson 2016; Lee and Sohn 2019; Liang et al. 2019; Moritz et al. 
2015; Younkin and Kuppuswamy 2018) affect the success of the project getting the desired funding. Keeping 
funders updated with frequent announcements have a beneficial effect on the success of high-tech projects (Wu 
et al. 2015). By contrast, concealing information is a deterring factor (Burtch et al. 2016). In equity-based 
crowdfunding, effective signals in the form of detailed information about the project risks increase the 
likelihood of the project succeeding with its funding goal (Ahlers et al. 2015). Investor discussions also propel 
investments with the exception of some discussion topics such as market risk (Kleinert and Volkmann 2019). 
Moreover, nonfinancial investments, such as customer involvement in the form of product ideas for reward-
based crowdfunding projects, have been shown to be beneficial (Cornelius and Gokpinar 2020). Finally, a 
project is perceived as having more legitimacy when the funding target is lower and the project duration is 
8 
 
shorter (Frydrych et al. 2014). Setting the right price for crowdfunding depends on the market size and 
subsequent advertising efforts (Guan et al. 2020). 
3) Motivation to contribute to a crowdfunding project. This theme covers papers that investigate what 
motivates funders to contribute to a certain project. Previous research has investigated the phenomenon from an 
individual (funder), project, or platform perspective.  
According to Gerber and Hui (2013), the funders’ motivation to contribute to reward-based projects are to 
collect the reward, support people and causes, and be part of a community (Gerber and Hui 2013). Backers’ 
prosocial motivation further increases with goal proximity and project prosociality (Li and Wang 2019). Also 
examining reward-based crowdfunding projects, Zvilichovsky et al. (2018) found that the funders’ focus is on 
the product and less on the people. Additionally, backers prefer to have some options (Du et al 2019a), such as 
crowdfunding lottery (Du et al. 2019b) and early bird options (Wessel et al. 2019). Gleasure and Feller (2016a) 
showed that the funders’ motivation to donate to individuals are predicated by personal interactions between the 
funders and the project creators, while donations to organizations are strongly influenced by the fundraising 
targets. Men and women show different preferences with women more likely than men to invest at the early 
funding stages (Ryu et al. 2020). For equity-based projects, the firm logos’ complexity (Mahmood et al. 2019), 
firm attributes and owners’ social media activities, financial statements (Nitani et al. 2019), and financial 
interest appear to be strong drivers for funders to invest in the projects (Cholakova and Chlarysse 2015). 
Interestingly, funders’ willingness to contribute to a project may also depend on how much funding the project 
has already attracted. Burtch et al. (2013) provide evidence for a substitution model (partial crowding-out effect) 
in crowdfunding, indicating that funders will withhold or lower their funding instead of matching the earlier 
funding if  they observe that other contributors have invested larger amounts than they would have. Similarly, 
Burtch et al. (2018) show the link between the existing capital accumulation and funders’ decision to contribute. 
Additionally, the interest in investing in equity-based crowdfunding projects in the context of technology 
ventures increases with combined signals of product certification, prominent customers, and social proof (Bapna 
2019). It is important to note that “the crowd” is not a homogenous group but a combination of investors with 
various profiles and motivations (Wallmeroth 2019).  
In the context of prosocial lending, lenders respond positively to linguistic cues that present the venture as a 
chance to support others and not as a business opportunity (Allison et al. 2015). The impact of an opinion-based 
social interaction is more sustainable than the effect of action-based interactions (Thies et al. 2016). In the 
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presence of rewards, the bids of group leaders on loan-based crowdfunding platforms decrease the interest and 
increase the default rates (Hildebrand et al. 2017). Finally, data concealment is found to affect the conversion of 
potential funders in a reward-based crowdfunding platform (Burtch et al. 2015).  
From the platform perspective, herding behavior on loan-based crowdfunding platform is influenced by the 
overall investment amount and the market share of the platform (Jiang et al. 2018). Choy and Schlagwein 
(2016) argued that IT affordances (i.e., the possibility of action enabled through the platform) affect funders’ 
motivation on charity crowdfunding platforms. They distinguished IT affordances for charity crowdfunding into 
cognition and action affordances and concluded that these affordances motivate contributors by making 
donations more effective and more social.  
4) Crowdfunding design. The last theme subsumes prior research that attempts to understand the design of 
crowdfunding and how it affects individuals’ behaviors (Gleasure and Feller 2016b). For example, Belleflamme 
et al. (2014) compared two crowdfunding designs, i.e., pre-ordering and profit sharing, and discovered that 
entrepreneurs prefer the pre-ordering version if the required fund is smaller than the market size. Belleflamme et 
al. (2015) investigated the key features and economic forces (i.e., price structure, funders’ behavior, social 
network structures and marketing aspects), which are at play to explain the design of crowdfunding platforms. A 
comparison between posted prices and auctions for loan-based crowdfunding shows the probability of funding 
for loans is higher for posted price loans (Wei and Lin 2017).  
5) Others. This final miscellaneous theme contains a number of studies that do not fit in any of the above 
outlined themes, but cover a potpourri of topics. For example, a literature review that identifies crowdfunding as 
crowdsourcing (Hossain 2015), a neo-institutional perspective on crowdfunding (Lehner and Harrer 2019), 
fraudulent project detection (Siering et al. 2016), journalism as specific crowdfunding context (Aitamurto 2011), 
funders’ satisfaction after funding a project (Xu et al. 2016), changes in the collective identity of a 
crowdfunding community (Gleasure and Feller 2016c), network effects (Thies et al. 2018), crowdfunding 
specific investment models (Tomczak and Brem 2013), the impact of the CrowdFund Act in the US (Stemler 
2013), crowd biases in equity crowdfunding (Stevenson et al. 2019a) and a review of equity crowdfunding 
(Mochkabadi and Volkmann 2020). 
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What We Don’t Know About Crowdfunding: Motivation for and Relevance of This Study 
Table 1 shows the gaps in the existing knowledge of crowdfunding. While reward-based crowdfunding 
platforms and the success factors of crowdfunding campaigns have received significant attention, loan-based 
crowdfunding, contributors’ motivation, and platform design are less researched (see Table 1). This comes as a 
surprise since the worldwide funding volume of loan-based crowdfunding triples the volume of reward-, 
donation- and equity-based crowdfunding combined (Fundly 2019). We refer to the related research to explain 
how our work adds new and relevant aspects that have not been investigated in previous studies, but that 
deserve attention.  
Our research will address the following question: How do platform design features affect the funding 
motivation of Muslim users on a loan-based crowdfunding platform?  
Previous research on loan-based crowdfunding mostly focuses on market-driven mechanisms, such as 
herding behavior, which is affected by the overall investment amount and market share of the platform (Jiang et 
al. 2018), bids from group leaders (Hildebrand et al. 2017), and posted price loans (Wei and Lin 2017). Allison 
et al. (2015) used cognitive evaluation theory to investigate how the wording of the project narrative influences 
prosocial lenders. Choy and Schlagwein (2016) used affordance and motivation theory to investigate technical 
features of donation-based crowdfunding platform as a whole and how these features, which afford certain user 
interactions correlate with users’ motivation to donate to charitable projects in comparison with  offline settings. 
Previous research on loan-based crowdfunding as well as extant research on funders’ motivation have not 
investigated how altering the design of a crowdfunding platform affects funders’ motivation to participate in a 
project.  We choose Muslim funders because they are an overlooked population in crowdfunding research. 
Islamic religious constraints regulate monetary transactions concerning lending and investing. This asks for a 
separate investigation as the research on Islamic banking (e.g., Aldohni 2014) and the influence of religion on 
customer behavior (e.g., Assadi 2003) shows. Focusing on the under-researched group of Muslim users makes 
our study on loan-based crowdfunding unique.  
We build on Andreoni’s warm-glow giving theory and Sober and Wilson’s differentiated egoism aspects as 
a theoretical foundation to redesign a loan-based crowdfunding platform (see section “Theoretical Foundation”). 
Specifically, these theories help to explain what types of incentives may motivate Muslim users’ contributions 
in loan-based crowdfunding (or not). Gleasure and Feller (2016a) also built their study on Andreoni’s warm-
glow theory, but focused on donation-based platforms and subsequently on the altruism aspect  of this theory – 
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not on the egoism aspect. When people are donating money, they do not expect the recipient to return the 
money. However when people are lending money, they expect the recipient to return the money at some point of 
time in the future, often with interest. Hence in our study on loan-based crowdfunding for Muslim users, we 
focus on the other end of the continuum, i.e., egoistic instead of altruistic motivation. Our study offers a 
potential contribution by proposing that religious constraints may challenge the commonly agreed upon egoistic 
motivator, which is the interest rate in loan-based crowdfunding platforms. 
Table 2 compares related work on loan- and donation-based crowdfunding investigating contributors’ 
motivation with our research. In the next section, we elaborate on the theoretical foundation of this paper and 
develop research hypotheses.  
Table 2. Comparison Between Related Research and This Work  
Source Context Theoretical Foundation Type Focus on Sample 
Allison et al. 
(2015) 
Compare intrinsic and 












crowdfunding – online 
and offline  
Affordance theory; 
motivation theory 
Qualitative Project Chuffed 
(Australia 
and US)  
Gleasure and 
Feller (2016a) 
Explain differences in 
motivation for charitable 
donations  
Andreoni’s warm-
glow giving theory  
(focus on altruism) 




et al. (2017) 
Investigate the effect of 
the bids of group leaders 
on the interest and 









Quantitative Platform Prosper 
(US) 
Jiang et al. 
(2018) 
Investigate herding 
behavior in loan-based 
crowdfunding 
Literature on herding 
behavior 
Quantitative Platform Wdzj.com 
(China) 
Wei and Lin 
(2017) 
Compare posted price 
loan vs. auction on 
funders’ motivation to 
make a loan 
Game theoretical 
model 
Quantitative Platform Prosper 
(US) 
This work Investigate how loan-
based crowdfunding 






glow giving theory 




(focus on egoism) 










Pure altruism implies that people contribute purely for idealistic reasons (Harbaugh et al. 2007; Andreoni 
1990). From a normative perspective, pure altruism occurs when “individuals give solely because it improves 
the circumstances of the recipient and serves the public good” (Gleasure and Feller, 2016a, p.504). The focus is 
on the other person and the public good and not on the giver. Thus, neither the source nor the intent matters as 
long as the recipient/s are served (Harbaugh et al. 2007). On the other side of this spectrum is egoism, which is 
the direct opposite of pure altruism.  
Egoism occurs when individuals give solely because of the expectation of profit (Altman 2015). In this case, 
altruistic aspects do not affect egoists’ donations, as they are only motivated by their personal utility benefit. 
The theory distinguishes between different egoistic motivations. In the following section, we discuss warm-
glow giving (Andreoni 1989) and hedonism (Sober and Wilson 1998), which are relevant for our context.  
A feeling of warm-glow giving (Andreoni 1989, 1990) occurs from the act of giving itself, usually with 
reference to contributing to a project that increases the public good or is supposed to support a recipient (Altman 
2015). In this case the motivation to give “is not purely to provide the public good per se,” but rather to receive 
a personal reward, which may include gaining prestige and respect (Andreoni 1989, 1990; Altman 2015). The 
reward is associated with an emotional ‘warm glow’ when contributing (Ferguson et al. 2008) that is purely 
internal contentedness, usually a pleasant feeling or a boost in self-esteem (Anik et al. 2009, Harbaugh 1998). 
The strong motivational effect of warm-glow giving has been demonstrated in various experiments (e.g., 
Crumpler and Grossman 2008; Ferguson et al. 2008). The support for the motivational impact of warm-glow 
giving also comes from neuroscience. Harbaugh et al. (2007) demonstrated that the neural brain response in 
humans is similar when they transfer money to charity organizations and when they receive money. A second 
aspect of egoism in addition to warm-glow giving is hedonism (Sober and Wilson 1998). Hedonism 
incorporates psychological and evolutionary egoism. The ultimate desire of a hedonistic person is self- rather 
than other-directed; this represents the psychological component. The evolutionary component states that the 
contributor aims to increase his or her individual fitness in comparison to others. For example, obtaining a 
material benefit is self-directed and represents an individual advantage.     
The phenomenon of pure altruism is useful in explaining the phenomenon of ‘crowding-out’ (Gleasure and 
Feller 2016a). If the funder is only interested in the overall welfare benefit or the overall benefit for the recipient 
of the loan, he or she may be discouraged from giving money in cases when the project has already attracted 
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some funding. Thus, ‘crowding-out’ helps to understand why the presence of some investment can end up 
discouraging prospective funders, instead of encouraging them. Pure altruism can harm a project because the 
potential funders think the needs of the individual or organization are already met or better met than those of 
others. These dynamics have been observed for reward-based crowdfunding projects where the potential funders 
did not contribute to a campaign that had already received a lot of support (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2013). 
However, when the giver is not completely selfless in his or her giving as in the egoistic scenarios (i.e., warm-
glow and hedonism), there is still a benefit for the giver in contributing – in the form of a warm glow or a 
material benefit. This explains why ‘crowding-out’ is not an absolute phenomenon (see Table 3 for details).    
Table 3. Difference Between Pure Altruism, Warm-Glow Giving and Hedonism (based on 
Altman 2015; Andreoni 1989, 1990; Gleasure and Feller 2016a; Sober and Wilson 1998) 




Reason to contribute To improve the circumstances of the recipient and serve the public good 
To gain a personal 
internal reward 
To gain a private self-
directed material utility 
benefit  
With regard to the 
crowding-out phenomenon 
Explains and generates the 
‘crowding-out’ phenomenon 
Does not create a ‘crowding-out’ effect and 
explains that it is not an absolute phenomenon 
 
Research Hypotheses 
A variety of aspects influence the willingness to participate in a crowdfunding project. The previous section 
outlined how Andreoni’s warm-glow giving theory and Sober and Wilson’s model of evolutionary and 
psychological egoism provide a useful framework to study how persuasive technologies, such as online 
crowdfunding platforms, influence their users’ giving behavior. However, further investigation is needed to 
determine to what degree warm-glow giving and hedonism are involved in persuading users to fund a project on 
a loan-based crowdfunding platform.  
Many loan-based crowdfunding platforms advertise the potential to gain personal utility benefits. A key 
aspect of our research is to take religiously constrained Muslim users into account. Muslims have specific laws 
concerning monetary transactions that are widely known as Sharia law (Aldohni 2014). The Quran provides not 
only spiritual guidelines to Muslims but also a code of conduct that regulates peoples’ material lives and 
businesses. With its foundation in the Quran, Islamic economic rules are much older than most Western 
economic paradigms (Presley and Sessions 1994). The most important aspects of Islamic economics that are 
relevant for this study are a sense of justice and equality, the duty to work, and the prohibition of interest for 
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loans. In the first aspect, the Quran encourages Islamic societies to guarantee basic services, including food and 
healthcare, for everybody. The second aspect aims at social justice and that every member of the society should 
use his or her abilities and skills in work. The application of the third aspect, the riba law, essentially prohibits 
conventional interest (Presley and Sessions 1994). While the first aspect demonstrates a deeply rooted need for 
charitable activities in Muslim societies, the second and third aspects condemn the concept of interest rates since 
all financial gains should be based on labor and money should not just increase the principal capital as a 
compensation for time, i.e., the duration of time the money is lent (Aldohni 2014). Thus, in particular, riba is in 
complete contrast with Western capitalist economic and financial paradigms and is, accordingly, in conflict with 
how most loan-based crowdfunding platforms are designed. 
Generally, people take loans for two reasons - for personal consumption and for business investment. 
According to Noorzoy (1982), riba is unlawful for both types of loans. For personal consumption loans, the 
borrower must be considered to be in dire need of such a loan to maintain a minimum standard of living. 
Providing a loan without interest to someone who is in need is seen as a way to reduce income inequity, which 
is highly valued in Islamic law. For business investment loans, riba is prohibited to maintain the redistribution 
of purchasing power from the rich to the poor and to prevent the lender from making an income without labor. 
The law inhibits idle cash accumulation and encourages capital holders to invest directly through 
proprietorships, active partnerships, or purchases of shares; hence, it promotes a profit-sharing model in 
business investment (Noorzoy 1982). Islamic investors, consequently, should not be compensated by interest 
but should take other means into account (Presley and Sessions 1994). 
Warm-glow giving or the emotional benefit for giving in support of an individual, an organization, or the 
society, has been shown as a strong driver of human behavior (e.g., Andreoni 1990). In the context of Islamic 
economics, warm-glow giving neither contradicts nor contests Sharia law, since the law regulates monetary 
transactions and not the psychological effect generated from the transaction. Therefore, the feeling of warm-
glow generated as the result of funding or supporting a project should motivate crowdfunding users, including 
religious Muslim users, to support a project on a loan-based crowdfunding platform.  
As social beings, one of humanity’s basic needs is to be accepted by others and to be part of a community. 
When someone makes a  loan, the return is not necessarily something material but it can be something 
intangible in the sense that s/he feels that s/he is offering something as part of a community which, in turn, 
increase his/her psychological comfort. “Sense of community is a feeling that members have of belonging, a 
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feeling that members matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith that members’ needs will be met 
through their commitment to be together” (McMillan and Chavis 1986, p.9). Ummah or the worldwide 
community of Muslims means that every Muslim is part of a supra-national community. Additionally, Islamic 
law encourages building relationships with others and fosters social interactions, which often exhibit a positive 
effect on people who feel a sense of inclusion in a community (Rosen 1984). Therefore, sense of community 
should have a positive link with Muslim users’ motivation to participate in loan-based crowdfunding platforms. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1): Sense of community positively affects Muslim funder’s willingness to participate in 
loan-based crowdfunding. 
Sober and Wilson (1998) highlighted that an individual focuses on increasing his/her individual fitness and 
the ultimate desire is directed to improving one’s own situation. Concerning loan-based crowdfunding 
platforms, this expectation generally comes from anticipating the interest or monetary gains during the loan 
period. The funder sees a private utility benefit in receiving a monetary benefit for his/her participation in a 
project on a loan-based crowdfunding platform. While Sharia law does not regulate the psychological, i.e., the 
emotional sensation evoked by the feeling of belonging to a community, the law explicitly forbids expecting 
conventional interest for loans. Therefore, material hedonism, in the form of interest for a loan for a 
crowdfunding project, should be an inhibiting factor for Muslim users to engage in such project. The selfish 
increase in individual fitness at other people’s costs violates Muslims’ moral codes. Subsequently, we 
hypothesize the following: 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2): Expectation of loan interest negatively affects Muslim funder’s willingness to 
participate in loan-based crowdfunding. 
Similar to previous studies, we expect a positive relationship between the level of participation in a 
crowdfunding platform and the amount an individual is willing to lend. Zvilichovksy et al. (2018) showed that 
when the funders are motivated to participate in a crowdfunding project, they are also willing to increase the 
pledged sum. According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957), when people engage in behavior that 
is inconsistent with their beliefs, they will experience psychological discomfort (dissonance), which they are 
motivated to reduce. A typical example of the theory is smoking behavior. The dissonance is reduced by 
rationalizing the behavior, such as rationalizing that smoking reduces stress, or minimizing the undesirable 
consequences such as underestimating the health risks of smoking. In general, a common way to reduce 
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dissonance is to increase the attractiveness of the behavior. In this study, dissonance occurs when Muslims 
participate in a loan-based crowdfunding platform that is inconsistent with their belief (i.e., a platform offering 
loan interest). The way to reduce this dissonance is to increase the attractiveness of the lending behavior. 
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between the level of participation in a crowdfunding platform and 
the amount an individual is willing to lend is greater when there is discrepancy between the Muslim belief and 
the platform design as a way to increase the attractiveness of the lending behavior (i.e., a higher amount of 
interest earned). Thus, we also hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3): The Muslim funder’s willingness to participate in loan-based crowdfunding positively 
affects the amount to lend. This effect is greater when there is an expectation of loan interest. 
Research Methodology 
To test these hypotheses, we developed two loan-based crowdfunding platform designs, which correspond to 
the two egoistic motivators of Andreoni’s theory of warm-glow giving and Sober and Wilson’s model of 
evolutionary and psychological giving. We also developed a control design that corresponds to the altruism 
motive. We used a scenario-based online survey as the instrument of data collection. The scenarios depict the 
crowdfunding platform designs. The survey assesses the participants’ responses to the project page and their 
demographics. The target population of this study is Muslims in Indonesia. Muslims form the majority of 
Indonesia’s population (88.1%); there are more than 205 million Muslims in Indonesia (PewResearchCenter 
2015), which is the largest Muslim population in the world. The survey was distributed through Islamic 
communities.  
Each subject is exposed to only one randomly selected design of the loan-based crowdfunding platform; 
thereby we avoid confounding effects that may arise when the participants encounter multiple designs (Charness 
et al. 2012). The scenario is based on three different crowdfunding designs (i.e., a hedonism-related design, a 
warm-glow giving-related design, and a control design representing altruism). The treatment designs represent 
the independent variables. The dependent variables are the willingness to participate in a crowdfunding project 
(WTP) and the decision on the amount of money to lend – known as the amount to lend (ATL). We include a 
number of control variables that may influence our dependent variables: age, gender, income level, knowledge 
of crowdfunding platforms, desire for information completeness before lending, and personal interest in 
agriculture (which is the crowdfunding project topic). Table 4 provides an overview of all variables. Figure 1 
depicts the research model.  
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Table 4. Overview of the Variables 




Willingness to Participate 
(WTP) 
and  
Amount to Lend (ATL) 
Gender 
Level of income (monthly income; MI) 
Level of knowledge about crowdfunding (KCF) 
Need for complete information before lending (NCI) 
Level of personal interest in agriculture (PI) 
 




There are two steps in the data collection process. First, one of the three designs of our loan-based 
crowdfunding platform is randomly sent to each respondent. The survey system does the randomization 
automatically. This double-blind method (i.e., a method to ensure that neither the subjects nor the researchers 
influence which design the participants are exposed to) is essential to prevent an observer-expectancy effect 
(i.e., a cognitive bias that causes the researcher to subconsciously influence the subjects, for example by 
distributing particular designs to specific participants). The scenario puts the respondent in the situation of being 
a potential lender on a loan-based crowdfunding platform. After being exposed to one platform design, the 
respondents have to respond to questions about their WTP and ATL as well as the control variables. Each 
respondent receives the same questions independent of the design received. WTP is measured using four items, 
e.g., “I am interested in lending my money for this project.” The participants’ ATL is assessed in Indonesian 
currency (rupiah or Rp). Additionally, the respondents have to answer a set of questions, which serve as control 
variables. Appendix A lists the survey items. All constructs are derived from the literature but adjusted for the 
fit of this study. We tested the scenarios and the survey in our pilot study to ensure that the scenarios with the 
design modifications are properly thought through. Additionally, we conducted a manipulation check before 




We conducted a pilot study to pretest the feasibility of the study setting. The pilot study consisted of two 
steps. In the first step, we randomly divided nine participants into three groups that correspond to the three loan-
based crowdfunding platform designs. The nine participants were recruited from Islamic communities. We 
monitored each respondent to ensure s/he went through the platform and read all the survey questions carefully. 
At the end of the survey, every respondent provided feedback, comments, and suggestions related to the 
platform design, survey questions, and the procedure. We enhanced the hedonism design following the feedback 
from a respondent who remarked that she did not notice the interest rate. In the second step, we consulted an 
expert, a management science researcher, about the scenario-based survey. Based on the feedback, we changed 
the order of the survey items to begin with the dependent variables. In this order, the respondents answer the 
important questions related to the dependent variables first (i.e., willingness to participate and amount to lend) 
while their mental capacity is still high. The expert also suggested changing from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-
point Likert scale to ensure a sufficient range of variance in our variables. 
Base and Treatment Designs 
The base design is necessary to compare any of the treatment designs to test the hypotheses. The base design 
displays the tabs of the project page (i.e., project description, business progress, FAQ (see Figure 2)), loan 
report, and a loan option page (see Figure 3).  
The first treatment design (Figure 4, Column ‘Warm-glow Giving Community Modifications’) is to test the 
effect of belongingness to a community as a personal benefit. Compared to the base design, this design has 
several modifications based on warm glow giving theory. First, there is an invitation paragraph on the project 
page between the borrower information and the project statistics that invites lenders to join a ‘community of 
lenders’ (called ‘Sahabat Taawun’) by providing loans. The text to join a ‘community of lenders’ by providing 
loans is also displayed in the loan option page (the last page). The feeling of belongingness to a community is a 
warm-glow feeling. This design does not display any interest rates.  
The second treatment design (Figure 4, Column ‘Hedonism Model Modification’) aims to test the hedonism 
effect. Compare to the base design, this design has several modifications. First, there is an overview paragraph 
in the project page between the borrower information and the project statistics highlighting the expected interest 
rate for the lender. In the statistic part, there is additional information that mentions the minimum interest rate. 
Moreover, there is information of the interest rate in the FAQ page. Second, we include a description paragraph 
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in the loan option page (the last page) on top of the list of loan options, which describes what lenders can expect 
in return for their loan. All these modifications to describe the material private utility benefit aim to portray 
hedonism. 
Manipulation Check 
To ensure that the manipulation is perceived as intended, we conducted a manipulation check with 
respondents from the Muslim population in Indonesia. Appendix B shows the characteristics of the respondents 
for the manipulation check. Each respondent was randomly assigned to one design, i.e., the base (altruism) 
design, warm-glow design, or hedonism design. The survey system does the randomization automatically. 
Although we set the randomization to balance the number of respondents across the three designs, some 
respondents did not complete the survey and were removed. In the end, we had 52 respondents for the base 
(altruism) design, 46 respondents for the warm-glow design, and 51 respondents for the hedonism design. 
Regardless of the loan-based crowdfunding design that they received, all respondents had to answer the survey 
items on a 7-Likert scale measuring altruism (“When I  make a  loan, I will be doing something to help others”), 
warm-glow feeling (“When I make a  loan, I will feel good that I am part of ‘Sahabat Taawun’” [which is a 
community of lenders represented in the design]), and hedonism (“When I make a  loan, I will receive interest 
on my money”).  
We found that the respondents who received the warm-glow treatment perceived that they had more feeling 
of warm glow (mean 6.41, std. deviation 0.69) than those who received the base (altruism) design (mean 4.60, 
std. deviation 1.40, p < .00) or the hedonism design (mean 4.50, std. deviation 1.56, p < .00). The respondents 
who received the hedonism design gave a higher score to the hedonism survey item (mean 6.27, std. deviation 
1.58) than those who received the base (altruism) design (mean 2.52, std. deviation 1.84, p < .00) or the warm-
glow design (mean 2.54, std. deviation 1.60, p < .00). Finally, the respondents who received the base design 
gave a higher score to  the altruism survey item (mean 6.29, std. deviation 1.08, p < .00) than those who 
received the warm-glow design (mean 5.17, std. deviation 1.15, p < .00) or the hedonism design (mean 5.30, std. 
deviation 1.45, p < .00). We also conducted between-groups ANOVA and found that there were significant 
differences between the groups with respect to the feeling of warm glow (F = 31.45, p = .00), hedonism (F = 





Figure 2. Base Design: Project Page 





Figure 3. Base Design: Loan Report Tab and Loan 
Option Page 






Figure 4. Warm-glow Giving Community and Hedonism Modifications 
Warm-glow Giving Community 
Modifications Hedonism Modifications 








































Data Analysis of the Main Study 
We had 153 respondents for the main study (52 received the base design, 50 received the warm-glow 
community design, and 51 respondents received the hedonism design). The central limit theorem suggested that 
a sample size of at least 30 is sufficient to produce an approximately normal sampling distribution for the 
sample mean; in other words, the average of the sample mean will be approximately equal to the population 
mean (Hogg et al. 2015). Having a sufficient sample for each design, we proceeded with our analyses. Tables 5 
and 6 show the demographic characteristics of the respondents. We checked the effectiveness of the 
randomization by comparing the mean values of the demographics across the three groups of respondents. Using 
ANOVA and pairwise tests, we found all comparisons are not significant (see Appendix C); hence, providing 
evidence of equivalence of the three groups of respondents. 







Male 66 43.1% 
Female 87 56.9% 
Monthly Income (MI) 
Rp5,000,000 or lower 51 33.3% 
Rp5,000,001 – Rp7,500,000 39 25.5% 
Rp7,500,001 – Rp10,000,000 18 11.8% 
Rp10,000,001 – Rp12,500,000 5 3.3% 
Rp12,500,001 – Rp15,000,000 8 5.2% 
Rp15,000,001 – Rp17,500,000 2 1.3% 
Rp17,500,001 – Rp20,000,000 11 7.2% 
Rp20,000,001 – Rp22,500,000 6 3.9% 
Rp22,500,001 – Rp25,000,000 4 2.6% 
Rp25,000,001 – Rp27,500,000 2 1.3% 
Rp27,500,001 – Rp30,000,000  0 0.0% 
RP30,000,001 or above 7 4.6% 
Knowledge of Crowdfunding Platforms (KCF) 
I do not know anything about them 28 18.3% 
I only heard the names (the website) but I am not sure what it is 41 26.8% 
I know at least how one of them works 33 21.6% 













Age 26.56  6.542 18 57 1.381 2.882 
 
It is important to note that Indonesia is a developing country where the average monthly income for 
Indonesians is Rp 4,666,667 (CNN Indonesia 2019). Taking this information into account, one-third of our 
respondents are average Indonesians who have an average income; two-thirds of respondents earn above the 
average income. Hence, our respondents should be financially able to fund a local project in a crowdfunding 
platform and are, therefore, valid respondents. 
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The construct validity of need for complete information (NCI), personal interest in agriculture (PI), and 
willingness to participate (WTP) was checked (see Appendix D for the factor analysis – rotated component 
matrix). The survey items loaded higher on their own construct than on the other constructs and the item 
loadings exceeded 0.7 on their own construct. We also assessed the reliability of the construct. The Cronbach’s 
alpha of our dependent variable WTP was 0.835. The Cronbach’s alpha of the control variable NCI was 0.741. 
Thus, all are above the recommended threshold of 0.7. PI was measured with a single item. Descriptive statistics 
of the continuous variables in Table 6 show that the skewness and kurtosis values are between the acceptable 
range of -2 to 2 and -3 to 3, respectively. We also checked for multicolinearity (see Appendix E) and found no 
multicolinearity issue. 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ATL 208,562.32  160,900.804  0 500,000 0.578 -0.780 
NCI 6.016  0.934  3.00 7.00 -0.938 0.238 
PI 5.68  1.033  1.00 7.00 -1.180 2.627 
WTP 4.68  1.512  1.00 7.00 -1.062  0.394 
Note: ATL=amount to lend, NCI=need for complete information, PI=personal interest in agriculture, WTP=willingness to 
participate. 
Findings 
We used generalized linear model (GLM) regression for the dependent variable willingness to participate 
(WTP) and Poisson regression for the dependent variable amount to lend (ATL). The result, presented in Table 
7, supports H2 (Expectation of loan interest negatively affects Muslim funders’ willingness to participate in 





Table 7. Analysis for Willingness to Participate (WTP) 
 Model 1 (Control Variables Only) 
Model 2 (Independent 
Variable Only) 
Model 3 (Independent and 
Control Variables 
Independent 
Variables Coef.  Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err 
Warm-glow 
giving  
  -0.083 0.295 -0.217 0.305 
Hedonism   -0.649* 0.294 -0.720* 0.301 
Control 
Variables 
      
KCF1   0.445  0.379    0.490 0.376 
KCF2  0.151  0.333    0.201 0.331 
KCF3 0.510  0.349   0.569  0.348 
PI 0.208  0.130   0.198  0.129 
NCI -0.065  0.133   -0.095  0.132 
Gender  -0.148  0.254   -0.099 0.252 
Age 0.013  0.025   0.007 0.024 
MI2 -0.470  0.344   -0.446  0.340 
MI3   -1.504** 0.460      -1.365** 0.462 
MI4 -1.353 0.738   -1.440 0.738 
MI5 -0.276 0.630   -0.313 0.621 
MI6  -2.458* 1.162    -2.650* 1.155 
MI7 -0.735 0.550   -0.653  0.541 
MI8 -0.315 0.725   -0.379  0.716 
MI9 -1.182 0.837   -1.016  0.828 















Log likelihood -264.314  -276.951  -260.968  
Note: KCF = crowdfunding knowledge, MI = monthly income, NCI = need for complete information, PI = personal interest 
in agriculture, WTP = willingness to participate. 
***: p < .001, **: p < .010, *: p < .050 
The results of the second analysis with ATL as a dependent variable, presented in Table 8, support H3 (The 
Muslims’ willingness to participate in loan-based crowdfunding positively affects the amount to lend. This effect 
is greater when there is an expectation of loan interest). The results indicate that the incident rate for WTP x 
hedonism design is 1.531 times higher, holding the other variables constant. Figure 5 plots the willingness to 
participate (WTP) on the amount to lend (ATL) for each crowdfunding design (base, treatment 1 [warm-glow 
giving], treatment 2 [hedonism]), when controlling for the level of monthly income. Compared to the other 
designs, participants in the hedonism design’s willingness to engage in crowdfunding had a positive exponential 





Table 8. Analysis for Amount to Lend (ATL) 
 Model 1 (Control Variables Only) 
Model 2 (Independent 
Variable Only) 
Model 3 (Independent 
and Control Variables 
Independent Variables IRR Std. Err IRR Std. Err IRR Std. Err 
WTP   1.072*** 0.000 1.057*** 0.000 
Warm-glow giving   0.658*** 0.001 0.717*** 0.002 
Hedonism   0.120*** 0.000 0.116*** 0.000 
WTP x Warm-glow giving    1.107*** 0.000 1.090*** 0.000 
WTP x Hedonism   1.511*** 0.000 1.531*** 0.000 
Control Variables       
KCF1  1.524*** 0.000   1.373*** 0.000 
KCF2 1.183*** 0.000   1.063*** 0.000 
KCF3 1.240*** 0.000   1.065*** 0.000 
PI  1.227*** 0.000    1.182*** 0.000 
NCI  0.941*** 0.000    0.948*** 0.000 
Gender  1.053*** 0.000   1.098*** 0.000 
Age 1.029*** 0.000   1.027*** 0.000 
MI2  1.142*** 0.000   1.170*** 0.000 
MI3  0.781*** 0.000   1.069*** 0.000 
MI4  0.734*** 0.001    0.754*** 0.001 
MI5  1.023*** 0.001    0.935*** 0.001 
MI6  0.922*** 0.001    1.122*** 0.001 
MI7  0.832*** 0.000    0.791*** 0.000 
MI8  0.607*** 0.001    0.640*** 0.001 
MI9  0.765*** 0.001    1.052*** 0.001 










Note: KCF = crowdfunding knowledge, MI = monthly income, NCI = need for complete information, PI = personal interest 
in agriculture, WTP = willingness to participate, ATL = amount to lend. 
***: p < .001. 









Our findings highlight the importance of platform design for religiously constrained users. Specifically, the 
results show a negative effect of the hedonism design on Muslim users’ willingness to participate in loan-based 
crowdfunding. Egoism as a motivator, according to Andreoni’s warm-glow giving theory and Sober and 
Wilson’s differentiated egoism aspects, is supposed to have a positive effect in motivating users to fund a 
crowdfunding project. However, when this element is represented with monetary interest on a loan-based 
crowdfunding platform for Muslim users, the effect turns negative. Sharia law explicitly forbids riba in loans 
and, thus, effectively challenges the effect of this particular hedonistic aspect of egoism on loan-based 
crowdfunding platforms among Muslims. Our research demonstrates this effect. 
The motivator warm-glow giving for community is represented with a design that invites people to be part of 
a community of lenders called ‘Sahabat Taawun’ (Companion of Taawun). According to Andreoni’s warm-
glow giving theory, this design should have a positive effect in motivating users. However, we found that warm-
glow giving has no significant effect on the Muslim users’ willingness to participate in crowdfunding. There is 
no significant difference between the base (altruism) design and the warm-glow giving design in terms of their 
willingness to participate in crowdfunding. A possible explanation for this finding is that the principle of Sharia 
law suggests Muslims should expect nothing except the acceptance of Allah for their sincere honest deed. 
Although the modified design representing warm-glow giving for community is in accordance with Sharia law, 
some participants may consider it simply an unintended side-value from participating in Sharia-based 
crowdfunding design. Hence, we found no significant difference in their willingness to participate in 
crowdfunding. In contrast, riba is a well-known concept, and Sharia law explicitly forbids it with severe 
consequences.  
Further, our findings show a significant effect of users’ willingness to participate in the crowdfunding 
platform on the amount of money that the participant is willing to lend. This is not surprising. What is surprising 
is the finding for the hedonism treatment group. For this group, when the willingness to participate in 
crowdfunding is low, the amount that they are willing to lend is generally lower than in the other groups. 
However, when there is high willingness to participate in crowdfunding, the amount to lend is substantially 
higher than in the other groups. Taken together, it means that although most Muslims avoid riba, those who are 
willing to make a loan for monetary interest will give a substantial loan (the higher the loan, the higher the 
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interest). This is in line with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) – in the case of dissonance, people 
tend to reduce the discrepancy by increasing the attractiveness of their disassociating behavior.  
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
This research has several interesting theoretical and practical contributions. First, this paper addresses a 
research gap on the design of crowdfunding platforms. Although the amount of research on crowdfunding is 
increasing and covers a broad range of themes as summarized in the conceptual background section, there is 
scant research on crowdfunding that considers the design of crowdfunding platforms in encouraging 
participation. Moreover, studies on crowdfunding design focus on the economic mechanisms of such platforms 
(e.g., Belleflamme et al. 2014, 2015), or compare online and offline crowdfunding (Choy and Schlagwein 
2016). They do not investigate the design of specific features of a crowdfunding platform and its effect on 
funders’ motivation to fund a project. This study is an initial step in this important yet neglected research 
direction that can serve as a stepping stone for other studies.  
Moreover, while reward-based crowdfunding platforms have received significant research attention, there is 
relatively little attention on loan-based crowdfunding platforms. When considering the global market context, 
loan-based crowdfunding accounts for around 90% of global activity (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 
2017). This study contributes to the understanding of the design of loan-based crowdfunding platforms, 
specifically in motivating (or preventing) Muslim users to participate in such platforms. Loan-based 
crowdfunding platforms relate to the unique context of the Muslim community, because this community has 
religious constraints regarding monetary transactions in lending and investing money. So far, the existing loan-
based crowdfunding platforms have implemented a generic design and do not consider the particularities of 
certain user groups. Considering that Muslim communities make up a remarkable percentage of the population 
of many developing countries and represent an increasing share of the world population, the need for financial 
platform designs to accommodate their unique religious constraints is rising. This study is the first to examine 
the effect of religious constraints on funders’ decision making, which is a neglected topic in lending decision 
making in crowdfunding (see Hoegen, Steininger and Veit (2018) for an interdisciplinary review).  
The findings in this study provide some guidelines to loan-based crowdfunding platform designers to design 
a more inclusive platform so as not to discourage these religiously constrained users. For example, next to the 
conventional investment opportunity, the loan-based crowdfunding platform could offer Sharia-compliant loans 
that work with incentives such as donating the interest to charities. In this way, the fundraisers will still pay 
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interest on the money borrowed either to the lenders or to the charities of the lenders’ choice. Another possible 
inclusive design is an ‘organized tawarruq’ which has been used in the Islamic financial sector in some 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Ahmed and Aleshaikh 2014). In the context of loan-based 
crowdfunding, the platform owner as the organizer of tawarruq will need to organize several sales transactions 
with the borrowers and lenders separately. The platform owner first sells a commodity which could be a virtual 
commodity to a borrower at a price payable at a future date. Then the platform owner acts as an agent of the 
borrower to sell his/her commodity at a lower price to the lenders for cash. Hence, the borrower gets cash on the 
spot and owes the platform owner a higher amount of money. At a future date, once the amount owed has been 
repaid, the platform owner redistributes the money to the lenders through a variety of means such as 
membership bonuses, points, etc. Although this combination of sales transactions is permissible in Islam - 
“Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest” (verse 2:275 of the Quran) (Ahmed and Aleshaikh 2014, 
Alkhamees 2017) - since there is no physical exchange of a commodity between the parties involved, some 
countries declare that organized tawarruq is non-Sharia-compliant and the sales merely serve as means to create 
a debt resembling a loan with interest (Ahmed and Aleshaikh 2014, Alkhamees 2017). Hence, when designing 
an inclusive loan-based crowdfunding for religiously constrained funders, the designers should be aware of 
acceptable practices in the target countries.  
This work investigates and challenges Andreoni’s warm-glow giving theory and Sober and Wilson’s model 
by showing its boundaries in the context of loan-based crowdfunding for Muslim funders. We show that 
religious constraints, such as riba, can reverse the commonly agreed-upon motivator, i.e., monetary return. 
Egoism states that individuals contribute purely because of the expectation of a private utility benefit and is seen 
as an important motivational factor toward a particular behavior. However, our study proves that not all benefits 
are generalizable in different contexts. The prospect of increasing financial returns through interest rates when 
investing in a loan-based crowdfunding project is not a motivator for Muslim lenders. On the contrary, this 
financial benefit is an inhibiting factor and decreases Muslim lenders’ willingness to engage with the platform. 
Nevertheless, Muslim lenders who do not avoid the prospect of increasing financial returns through interest 
rates seem to be the most valuable creditors as they are willing to make substantial loans. 
A broader theoretical implication of our study is for researchers to re-examine the well-known ‘crowding-
out’ phenomenon in the context of loan-based crowdfunding for Muslim funders. It is widely accepted in the 
literature that if the funder is only interested in the benefit of the recipient of the loan (pure altruism), he or she 
may be discouraged from  giving money in cases when the project has already collected some funding - hence, 
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the ‘crowding-out’ effect (Gleasure and Feller 2016a). Although not directly investigated, our findings imply 
that pure altruism may not necessarily harm a project when the potential funders are Muslim. More research 
needs to be undertaken to establish the theoretical boundary of the ‘crowding-out’ phenomenon with respect to 
pure altruism, warm-glow giving, and hedonism when the crowdfunding participants have religious 
constraints/needs.    
Limitations and Future Research 
While our study highlights the importance of designing crowdfunding platforms to accommodate specific 
user groups especially those with religious constraints, future studies should examine in more detail how many 
more loans a crowdfunding project can achieve if the loan-based crowdfunding platform is tailored to such 
religious constraints (c.f. the conventional interest rate design of a loan-based crowdfunding platform). How a 
loan-based crowdfunding platform for Muslim lenders can achieve the best possible results for project creators 
and platform sustainability is another interesting question for future research.  
Due to the sensitivity of the matter and to avoid response bias, we did not ask the extent to which the survey 
participant is faithful to Islamic teaching, which might be an alternative explanation for our findings. Future 
research may suggest a way of assessing the survey participants’ faithfulness to their religion, while avoiding 
response bias on their behavioral responses and the potentially offending nature of the question.  
Online crowdfunding platform design may ameliorate pervasive constraints due to religion or culture. For 
instance, the platform may provide access to female lenders who prefer to support women-led projects in areas 
where women are historically under-represented (Greenberg and Mollick 2015), the platform may implement 
third-party institutional trust mechanisms to mitigate individuals’ biased preference for recipients who are 
culturally similar (Burch et al. 2014) and, as proposed in this study, the platform may provide an option other 
than conventional loan interest to address Muslim lenders’ religious constraints. Hence, our study adds another 
substantial meaningful implication for crowdfunding platform designers to consider creating a more inclusive 
platform. Future studies could assess other important religious or cultural constraints that may prohibit certain 
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Appendix A. List of Variables for the Main Study  
Variable Survey Items References 
Willingness 
To Participate  
(WTP; Likert 
scale) 
[WTP1] “I am interested in lending my money for this project” 
[WTP2] “I am interested in sharing the project in my social media” 
[WTP3] “I am interested in clicking the ‘like’ (recommend) button to 
recommend this project” 
[WTP4] “I am interested in visiting this page again” 
based on Kang et al. 
(2016) and Lacan and 










“Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements 
below. Please do not think too long before answering; usually, your first 
inclination is the most accurate one:” 
[NCI1] “Before lending, I need to know as much information as I can” 
[NCI2] “I need complete information before deciding whether to lend my 
money or not” 








“The platform that you saw previously is a crowdfunding platform. Some of 
the popular crowdfunding platforms are kickstarter.com, launchgood.com, 
kitabisa.com, investree.id, and modalku.co.id. 
Please state what you know about the existing crowdfunding platforms:” 
[KCF1] "I have participated in one of them at least once" 
[KCF2] “I know at least how one of them works” 
[KCF3] “I only heard the names (the website) but I am not sure what it is” 








“The project that you saw previously is an enterprise of modern urban 
farming using a hydroponic system. It is an example of modern agriculture 
(farming). Please indicate your level of personal interest in supporting 
enterprises like that:” 
[PI] "I am interested in supporting an agriculture / farming enterprise" 






“Please state your monthly income level:” 
[MI1] "Rp5,000,000 or lower” 
[MI2] “Rp5,000,001 - Rp7,500,000” 
[MI3] “Rp7,500,001 - Rp10,000,000” 
[MI4] “Rp10,000,001 - Rp12,500,000” 
[MI5] “Rp12,500,001 - Rp15,000,000” 
[MI6] “Rp15,000,001 - Rp17,500,000” 
[MI7] “Rp17,500,001 - Rp20,000,000” 
[MI8] “Rp20,000,001 - Rp22,500,000” 
[MI9] “Rp22,500,001 - Rp25,000,000” 
[MI10] “Rp25,000,001 - Rp27,500,000” 
[MI11] “Rp27,500,001 - Rp30,000,000” 












 Mean Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Age 27 18 57 1.151 1.748 
 
 
Appendix C. Main Study’s Comparison between Groups to Assess the Effectiveness of 
Randomization in Creating Equivalent Groups of Respondents  
Variable Pairwise Comparison Difference [Diff] Std. Error Tukey HSD Sig. 
Age base vs warm-glow giving  0.167 1.308 0.885 
base vs hedonism 1.824 1.295 0.339 
warm-glow giving vs hedonism 1.206 1.308 0.627 
Gender base vs warm-glow giving  0.096 0.099 0.599 
base vs hedonism 0.118 0.098 0.457 
warm-glow giving vs hedonism 0.022 0.099 0.974 
MI base vs warm-glow giving  0.157 0.596 0.962 
base vs hedonism 0.275 0.590 0.888 
warm-glow giving vs hedonism 0.432 0.596 0.750 
KCF base vs warm-glow giving  0.164 0.223 0.744 
base vs hedonism 0.176 0.222 0.707 
warm-glow giving vs hedonism 0.013 0.223 0.998 
PI base vs warm-glow giving  0.093 0.207 0.894 
base vs hedonism 0.059 0.206 0.956 
warm-glow giving vs hedonism 0.152 0.207 0.742 
Note: MI: monthly income, KCF: knowledge about crowdfunding, PI=personal interest in agriculture 
 
  
Appendix B. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents for Manipulation Check  
Demographic Characteristic Number of Subjects (N=149) Percentage 
Gender 
Male 74 49.7% 
Female 75 50.3% 
Monthly Income 
Rp5,000,000 or lower 52 34.9% 
Rp5,000,001 – Rp7,500,000 31 20.8% 
Rp7,500,001 – Rp10,000,000 21 14.1% 
Rp10,000,001 – Rp12,500,000 6 4.0% 
Rp12,500,001 – Rp15,000,000 8 5.4% 
Rp15,000,001 – Rp17,500,000 2 1.3% 
Rp17,500,001 – Rp20,000,000 14 9.4% 
Rp20,000,001 – Rp22,500,000 4 2.7% 
Rp22,500,001 – Rp25,000,000 4 2.7% 
Rp25,000,001 – Rp27,500,000 0 0.0% 
Rp27,500,001 – Rp30,000,000  0 0.0% 
RP30,000,001 or above 7 4.7% 
Knowledge of Crowdfunding Platforms 
I do not know anything about them 31 20.8% 
I only heard the names (the website) but I am not sure what it 
is 37 24.8% 
I know at least how one of them works 36 24.2% 
I have participated in one of them at least once 




Note: NCI=need for complete information, PI=personal interest in agriculture, WTP=willingness to participate. 
 
Appendix E. Main Study’s Correlation Table 
 
 Age Gender MI KCF PI NCI WTP ATL 
Age 1 -.046 .511 -.122 -.177 -.044 -.169 .152 
Gender -.046 1 -.140 .076 .017 -.015 .006 .053 
MI .511 -.140 1 -.163 -.124 -.011 -.187 -.018 
KCF -.122 .076 -.163 1 .039 -.122 .016 -.129 
PI -.177 .017 -.124 .039 1 .095 .165 .191 
NCI -.044 -.015 -.011 -.122 .095 1 .026 -.017 
WTP -.169 .006 -.187 .016 .165 .026 1 .397 
ATL .152 .053 -.018 -.129 .191 -.017 .397 1 
 
Note: MI: monthly income, KCF: knowledge about crowdfunding, PI=personal interest in agriculture, NCI=need for 
complete information, WTP=willingness to participate, ATL=amount to lend 
  
Appendix D. Main Study’s Factor Analysis Result  
 Component 
 WTP NCI PI 
I am interested in lending my money for this project. 0.875 -0.016 -0.027 
I am interest in sharing the project in my social media. 0.868 -0.041 0.059 
I am interested in clicking the ‘like’ (recommend) button to recommend this project. 0.891 0.069 -0.002 
I am interested in visiting this page again. 0.777 0.010 0.328 
Before lending, I need to know as much information as I can -0.020 0.900 0.018 
I need complete information before deciding whether to lend my money or not 0.030 0.895 0.051 
I am interested in supporting an agriculture / farming enterprise. 0.096 0.059 0.977 
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